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ABSTRACT
An important risk facing agents in a monetary economy arises from infla-
tion uncertainty: in the U.S. for the 1953-84 period, unexpected quarterly in-
flation had a standard deviation of 2.1%. The costs of such uncertainty are
likely to be even higher for multi-year contracts, since we estimate that a 1%
unexpected inflation this year implies an upward revision of 0.43% for ex-
pected inflation for the forthcoming year and 1% for the years beyond that.
The prospect of hedging inflation risk exposure using conventional financial
instruments is bleak, as has been widely documented.
We develop a theoretical case for Treasury bill futures as a inflation
risk hedge by jointly assuming that (1) the Fisher Hypothesis applies to
Treasury bill yields, (2) the Unbiased Expectations Hypothesis (UEH) applies
to futures prices, and (3) inflation is an autoregressive process. Our
empirical analysis shows that Treasury bill futures can reduce single-period
inflation risk by about 30-40%. The expected cost of using such futures is
close to zero, since we find that the Unbiased Expectations Hypothesis for
Treasury bill futures cannot be rejected. Our results provide new indirect
support for the Fisher Hypothesis.
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We have seen the great harm of unstable money. But can anything be
done about it? Must we accept the evils as dispensations of Pro-
vidence or Fate, as we accept earthquakes and tornadoes?
--Irving Fisher (1928: p. 107)
1. INTRODUCTION
An important risk facing all agents in a monetary economy arises from
fluctuations in the purchasing power of the unit of account: in the U.S.
economy, the dollar. If this risk prevails in the aggregate——that is, cannot
be diversified——it becomes a significant consideration for the conduct of
monetary and fiscal policy. But regardless of the macroeconomic policies
chosen, individuals may attempt to respond to this risk. Irving Fisher (1928:
p. 124) recommended that individuals do their best to reduce the costs of in-
flation risk, "making in the aggregate many millions of instances of adjust-
ments to counteract the effects of unstable money."
Fisher's advice is hard to implement. Scientific empirical studies find
that assets popularly believed to provide inflation hedges are ineffec-
tual——see Bodie (1976), Fama and Schwert (1977), and Fama (1981). Fortunate-
ly, Fisher's (1930) own hypothesis that variations in nominal yields are
driven by inflationary expectations provides the basis for constructing an in-
flation hedge. We show that a conjunction of:
(1) the Fisher Hypothesis,June 1987 page 2
(2) the Unbiased Expectations Hypothesis applied to futures, and
(3) an autoregressive inflationary process,
implies that Treasury bill futures will provide a hedge against unexpected in-
flation.
Our empirical analysis verifies the potential for successful inflation
hedging. We examine the period since 1976, when Treasury bill futures have
been trading on the International Monetary Market in Chicago. Participation
in Treasury bill futures is easy: the market is active ($5-lU billion daily
trading volume) with low transactions costs ($80 for a round trip on a futures
contract with face value of $1 million). We find that a short position in
Treasury bill futures generates cash flows that are positively correlated with
unexpected inflation. We also discuss issues related to extending our infla-
tion hedging results to a multiperiod setting.
Besides demonstrating a means of hedging against inflation, our work pro-
vides new support for the two important but contested conjectures that we in-
voke, i.e., the Fisher Hypothesis and the Unbiased Expectations Hypothesis.2
2. TREASURY BILL FUTURES AS AN INFLATION RISK HEDGE: THEORY
We consider two empirical economic conjectures: the Fisher Hypothesis
(FH) applied to Treasury bill yields (subsection 2.1) and the Unbiased Expec-
tations Hypothesis (UEH) applied to prices of Treasury bill futures (subsec-
the same reasoning, undertaking simultaneous short and long positions
in the spot market for Treasury bills with different maturities is likely to
provide an effective hedge against inflation. Of course, such a synthetic
forward position would incur higher transactions costs than a position using
futures contracts.
2Our support for the Fisher Hypothesis is indirect since our analysisas-
sesses an implication and since we invoke a chain of derivations and auxiliary
assumptions.June 1987
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tion 2.2). While there is an extensive sophisticated literature
evaluating
the FH, previous tests of the UEH may have been flawed. Weprovide correct
tests and find that the UEH is sustained for Treasury bill futures.This
result contrasts with the negative result for UEH appliedto the forward rates
implicit in the term structure. We examine the historical inflationprocess
for the United States and confirm theautoregressivity of inflation (subsec-
tion 2.3). Joint consideration of the two conjectures and theempirical
properties of inflation leads to our inflation hedging proposition (subsection
2.4).
2.1 The Fisher Hypothesis
Consider the decomposition of a single-periodTreasury bill nominal
yield,3 b, into expected inflation,Et_1lrt,andan ex ante real interest
rate, rt:
(1) b =r+
Our maintained hypothesis throughout thispaper is that expectations embedded
in asset prices are best linear unbiased. In equation(1), the interest rates
and the inflation rate are expressed as continuouslycompounded rates to
deliver the convenient additive expression; the one-unitholding period for
the Treasury bill to maturity from instant t—l to t is labeledby the closing
instant (i.e., t); r denotes the expected real return to be realizedby hold-
ing the Treasury bill over period t; lrt is the inflation over theholding
period t; Et_1lrt is the one-step-ahead expectation of inflationover the hold-
ing period, conditional on all information available at the instant t—l(when
3The distinction between ex ante andex post nominal, yields is irrelevant
for single-period nominal Treasury bills.June 1987 page 4
the yield on the Treasury bill is observed). More generally, Et_klrt denotes a
k-period-ahead forecast of inflation.
We identify two versions of the FR expressed in equation (1): the Weak
and the Strong. The Weak FH asserts that the ex ante real return on a nominal
asset is statistically independent of expected inflation.4 The Strong FH as-
serts in addition that a substantial portion of variations in ex ante nominal
yields is explained by variations in expected inflation.5 Formally the addi-
tional restriction of the strong version is:
(2) variance[Et_krt —Et_rt]
<< variance[Et_k1r —Et_jlrt],j>k>0.
Fama (1975) provides the classic study of the Strong FH for Treasury bill
yields; he concludes that the evidence does not reject the Strong FR. More
recently, Fania and Gibbons (1982) find that the variance of the innovations in
real returns is substantially smaller than that for the innovations in infla-
tion for the United States (a ratio less than 0.01). But the debate over the
validity of the FH is hardly settled. Summers (1983, 1984) interprets his
evidence to reject the FH. Patel (1986), who corrects earlier inconsistent
tests of the FH and updates the findings, discovers evidence from the Treasury
bills of the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada that is consistent with
the Strong FH.
But Patel's evidence, for the period since World War II, indicates that
real returns are negatively related to inflation regimes (for example, the
high inflation regime of the l970s was accompanied by negative real rates,
4Fisher would probably have qualified this statement by saying that it
holds only in the long run.
5A third version, articulated in Miller and Upton (1974), is that the
nominal return on nominal bonds is equal to the sum of the (real) return on an
otherwise identical purchasing-power-indexed bond and expected inflation.June 1987
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while the low inflation era in the Reagan years has beenaccompanied by posi-
tive real rates). If the strong FH fails in this fashion, the investorat
risk for unexpected inflation faces an additional class ofrisks, those as-
sociated with unexpected regime shifts in ex ante real rates ofreturn.
Recontracting period by period would not mitigate this risk.
In contrast to the above-cited papers that directly test theFH, this
paper develop and tests an indirect implication of the FH: the evidence is not
from spot yields but from cash flows associated with futurespositions.
2.3 Futures as Predictors of Future Spot Rates
A popular model for futures pricing is the Unbiased Expectations
Hypothesis. When applied to Treasury bill futures, the VEil becomes:6
(3) F =EtBt+k+ 6, 6 0.
Here F is the futures price prevailing at time t for a contract with
maturity date k periods hence (i.e., maturity date t+k); Bt+k is thespot
Treasury bill price prevailing at time t+k; and EtBt+k is the expectation of
Bt÷k conditional on information available at time t.
Direct tests of (3) need care since F andBt+k are flonstationary——see
the autocorrelations reported below in table 3.Earlier empirical studies of
the UEH overlooked estimation and testing problems that arise with nonstation-
ary price series, rendering their conclusions suspect. (See Cranger and New-
6Under mildly restrictive conditions, Jarrow andOldfield (1981) show
that the pricing of futures contracts is identical to that of forwardcon-
tracts. In such circumstances, the price of a Treasury bill futures contract
will reflect the forward yield implicit in spot Treasury bills.Combining
this result with the pure expectations theory of the term structure of inter-
est rates (assumed to hold for relevant maturities) and rational expectations,
the Treasury bill futures price becomes an unbiased forecast of the future
spot Treasury bill price (approximately). Of course, this is not the only
setting in which the UEH holds for Treasury bill futures.June 1987 page 6
bold (1986) on spurious regressions in such contexts.) We provide fresh
empirical evidence in support of the UEH, taking proper account of the (near)
unit autoregressive root in the price series that is associated with uncondi-
tional mean nonstationary behavior. Our testing of the UEH (which indirectly
assesses the ex ante cost of adding Treasury bill futures to a portfolio) also
highlights some pitfalls of using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation in
such circumstances.
Consider the following regression:
(4) Bt+k + /3F + ut+k.
Under the hypothesis of equation (3), the restrictions on regression (4) are
that a=O, 1.O, and ut+k is stationary with mean zero. Market efficiency im-
plies that Ut+k is unpredictable given the information set available at time
t. In the case of nonoverlapping data (i.e., where the data sampling interval
is not less than the length of the holding period [k]), Ut+kshouldbe white
noise. In the case of overlapping data, ut+k will be a moving average of the
order of the overlap.
For our purposes, we invoke the innocuous assumption that spot and fu-
tures prices converge at maturity:
/c\T'O 1, J) rt÷k=Dt+k,
where F÷k is the futures price with zero time left to maturity. The data
on Treasury bill futures were drawn from various issues of the International
Monetary Market yearbooks. The OLS estimates for the regression (4) for
values of t from one to six months, using (5) to substitute the maturity month
futures price for the maturity month spot price, are presented in table
7Stock (1985) shows that OLS provides consistent estimates of regressions
like equation (4) even when the variables are nonstationary as long as the er-
rors are stationary.June 1987 page 7
TABLE 1
FUTURES CONTRACT PRICES AS UNBIASED





Nonoverlapping Data, Quarterly Observationsa
1 1.53 0.98 2.05 0.34
2 3.60 0.96 2.30 0.53
3 23.38 0.76 2.01 0.66
Overlapping Data, Quarterly Observationsb
4. 15.03 0.84 1.67 0.64
5 15.22 0.84 1.30 0.67
6 34.65 0.65 1.29 0.76
aNone of the residual autocorrelations wassignificantly different from
zero.
bThe data for the regressions where k￿4overlapbecause we sample once
every quarter while the holding periods exceed a quarter. The residuals with
overlapping data regressions are consistent with an NA(l) process as predicted
by the null hypothesis. None of the second-order (or higher) residual
autocorrelations was significant.
The residuals appear to be stationary, as indicated by the Durbin-Watson
statistic (and by the residual autocorrelations [not reported]); theyappear
to be white noise with nonoverlapping data and moving-average of the firstor-
der, MA(1), with the overlap of one period. This finding is consistent with
the null hypothesis.8
8Further, in tests not reported, we found that the table 1residuals are
uncorrelated with past money growth, past changes in Treasury bill yields, and
past changes in inflation (also see related results in table 2).June 1987 page8
A superficial examination of the coefficient estimates suggests that a is
greater than zero and thatis less than 1.0.(Tests based on conventional
OLS standard errors indicate rejections of a=0 and =l.0.) However, since the
variables in the OLS-estimated regression are (near) nonstationary, the OLS
estimation is likely to be biased, possibly by a substantial amount for the
small sample size of 31 observations.9
We use Monte Carlo simulations to assess whether the table 1 estimates
are likely to have arisen under the null hypothesis of cr=0 and 8=1.0. Details
of the simulation method appear in the appendix. Briefly, we simulate the
Treasury bill prices using a univariate model consistent with the sample
period properties. We then compute simulated futures prices such that they
correspond to efficient forecasts of the future Treasury bill prices. In our
simulations, the UEH is true by construction.
We regress the simulated Treasury bill prices on the simulated futures
prices, obtaining estimates of a and based on 31 observations for Treasury
bill futures from maturities of one to six months. We repeat this 1,000
times. The histograms in figure 1 summarize the simulation results.
The actual estimates from table 1, shown as asterisks in these
histograms, are seen to be quite typical of the estimates from the simula-
tion.1° A sense of the power of tests is obtained by examining simulation
results from setting =0.l, which are shown in figure 2.There we observe
9Stock (1985) shows that (1) the OLS estimates of a regression likeequa-
tion (4) will have a bias that is a function of sample size (decreasing as
sample size increases) and (2) the standard errors of the estimates are not as
computed by conventional OLS routines.
10These results are of general interest. They suggest, for instance, the
nature of the corrections needed in tests of forward exchange rates as predic-





















































































































































































































































































































































Fl, 1:Resultsfrom 1000 simulations of regression of maturity—month
spot prices on futures prices (with maturities from 1 month to 6 months).
The.UnbiasedExpectations Hypothesis is true by construction. The upper
paneLshowsthe distribution of the constant (a) estimate, in the UEH
regression (see equation[12]);the lower panel shows the distribution
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that the table 1 estimates (again shown as asterisks) are quite atypical of a
situation where the true /3 is 0.1. We conclude that the table 1 results are
consistent with the UEH.
Simpler tests for the UEH, based on examining the change in the futures
price from t to t+k, can also be constructed. It follows from equation (5)
that EtBt+k =EtF÷k.Combine this result with the UEH in equation (3) to
obtain the hypothesis that the net cash flow from holding the futures con-
tract, C+k F÷k -F,has mean zero and is statistically independent
of the information available when the position is initiated (i.e., time t when
is set). Tests reported in table 2 fail to reject this hypothesis of
zero mean as well as the hypothesis of independence (specialized to absence of
correlation) of C+k with variables that are a subset of available informa-
tion at t such as (a) past c',(b)past growth in Ml (currency + demand
deposits), and (c) past inflation.1-1
11Theabsenceof a bias in futures prices is to be contrasted with the
systematic bias observed in forward Treasury bill contracts (constructed
synthetically using spot Treasury bills). Using 3-month and 6-month bills in
the 1960-85 period, we confirmed the results of Branch (1978), Lang and Raas-
che (1978), and others, that the implicit forward price was a systematically
downward biased forecast of the future spot price. The source of the
divergence between futures and forward prices remains to be satisfactorily
answered: contending explanations include differential tax treatments, market
segmentation due to relatively high transactions costs precluding exact ar-
bitrage, and interest rate risk for futures due to marking-to-the-market.
We did examine synthetic forward positions as hedges against inflation
risk for 1960-75 when Treasury bill futures did not trade (but 3-month and 6-
month Treasury bills were available). While results similar to those
presented in section 3 were obtained, we deemphasize them because of the
systematic divergence between forward prices and expectations of future spot
prices which also imply an expected cost for hedging inflation risk.June 1987 page10
TABLE 2
UNPREDICTABILITY OF CASH FLOWS FROM FUTURES POSITIONS
Sample Period: 76Q3-83Q2
C+3 =a+ + 2x_3+3x6+
x F-test: a =(L)=0 Significance Level
bJnflation 2.11 11
Money Growth 0.86 50
Industrial Produc-
tion Growth 0.22 92
Past Cash Flowsa 474a 31a
aThe test for past cash flows is simply for absence of serial correla-
tion. This test is a modified Box-Pierce statistic, which is distributed chi-
square with three degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis.
None of the tests in table 2 rejects the null hypothesis. In sum, the
evidence suggests that Treasury bill futures contracts are efficient, unbiased
predictors of future spot Treasury bill prices.12 This implies that there is
no ex ante premium when they are used. We now examine the inflation process.
2.3 Univariate Model for Inflation
After we observe the inflation in period t—l (from instant t-2 to instant
t—l), how should we revise our forecast for itt? In other words, how should
our forecast Et_1lrt differ from the one formed earlier, E21r? The ap-
propriate revision depends on the process governing inflation. Fama and Gib-
120ur examination of efficiency is restricted topredictions of quarterly
revisions of prices. Thus, for example, we have little to say about intraday
trading efficiency of the futures market discussed in Elton et al. (1984).June 1987
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bons (1984) show that the inflation forecast conditionalsolely on past infla-
tion provides a good approximation to the implicit inflation forecastof the
Treasury bill market (which presumably uses all information efficiently).If
valid, the result of Fama and Gibbons suggests a simple univariate modelof
inflation forecast revision.
The autocorrelations of the inflation process arelarge and persistent.
The autocorrelogram suggests a unit root in anautoregressive representation:
inflation appears to be a mean nonstationaryprocess. (Formal tests, not
reported, of a unit autoregressive root following Dickey and Fuller(1981) are
not rejected.) A single differencing is needed to obtainmean stationarity.
Suppose, then, that is a linear, stationary, stochasticprocess
where 1. is the backward differencing operator (i.e., In
this case, we can use the Wold theorem toexpress 1rt in terms of independent
and identically distributed innovations,ut:
(6) =0(L)ut.
Here, 0(L) l+01L÷92L2+... is a lag polynomial thatconverges for L inside or
on the unit circle;1-4 L is the lag operator (i.e.,Lxtxt_i). The representa-
tion (6) for inflation is the familiar integratedmoving average model,
IMA(l,q), where we have q terms in the lag polynomial, 0(L).15 Itnow follows
that
13A nonlinear modelmay be more appropriate to allow the conditional dis-
tribution of inflation to shift with the level. For instance,we may conjec-
ture that inflation follows an elastic random walk.
14We additionally assumeinvertibility for the differenced inflation
process—.-this ensures identification of the moving average parameters.
15We follow standard time-series notation.IMA(d,q) refers to a process
that needs to be differenced d times to be renderedstationary; the
stationarized process is a moving average of orderq.June 1987 page12
(7) Et_ilrt —Et_2lrt=(l+ei)ut_1,
where 9i is the first parameter in the moving-average representation of equa-
tion (6).
Equation (7) states that the one-period revision in forecasts for a given
future inflation is linearly related to the most recent innovation in infla-
tion (assuming that —1). We estimated an IMA(l,l) model for U.S. quarter-
ly inflation for the period of our study, l97686;l6 the results appear in
table 3.
TABLE 3
IMA(l,l) MODEL FOR CPI INFLATION
p +9ut_1+u;u 1s zero-mean white noise
Residual Autocorrelations at Lags:
Period p 0 1 2 3 4
76-86 -0.10 -0.52 2.61 0.03 -0.22 0.24 0.19
(0.19) (0.13)
76-82 -0.09 -0.46 2.81 0.02 -0.21 0.29 0.17
(0.30) (0.19)
83-86 0.01 -0.68 2.30 0.02-0.23 0.23 0.15
(0.21) (0.21)
NOTE: The standard errors of the coefficient estimates are in
parentheses.
Standard diagnostic tests (see Granger and Newbold (1986)) based on fit-
ting higher-order models and examination of the residual autocorrelations in-
dicate that the IMA(l,l) model is adequate for this period. Examining two
subperiods does not indicate any severe instability problems. In the IMA(1,l)
case where only 01 is nonzero in equation (6), we can extend (7) to
16The inflationary processes observed for the United Kingdom and Canada
also appear to be IMA(l,l).June 1987
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(8) Et_lirt_Et_krt =(l+91)(utl+ u_2 + + Utk).
Thus, the revision between any two dates in an inflation forecast fora fixed
future period is linearly related to the net surprise ininflation experienced
between the two dates)-7
2.4 Hedging Purchasing Power Risk
The substantiated individual hypotheses of subsections2.1, 2.2, and 2.3
jointly imply that Treasury bill futures will hedge purchasingpower risk.
The argument follows. Suppose we are to receive a nominal unitof currency
($1) in the future, say time t. Our expectation, as of timet—l, of the real
value of the $1 to be received is Et_i(l/Pt), whereP is the level of the
relevant price index that prevails at t. The risk is:
(9) (1/Pt) —Et_i(l/Pt)_Ut_l, small Iu_1I
where u_1 is the unexpected inflation experiencedover the period.
Assumptions: The maintained assumptions are the FH forspot Treasury bill
yields, the UEH for Treasury bill futures prices, an IMA(l,q) modelfor the
inflation process, and small unexpected inflation.
Proposition: At t—l, sell short 1/(1-f-91) units ofTreasury bill futures
contracts, where each unit calls for delivery at t of Treasury bills withface
value of $1 million. (Here O is the firstmoving-average coefficient in the
IMA(l,q) inflationary process.) This will hedge againstpurchasing power risk
over the same period (see equation (8)) such that a cash flow ofapproximately
17While equaton (7) continuesto apply for an IMA(1,q) process, q1,
equation (8) for two periods has to be modified to:
Eti1rtEt31rt(l+Ol)utl + (l+O1-+-92)ut2.
The extension to a k-period revision is straightforward.June 1987 page14
$10,000 will be generated per percentage point of unexpected inflation. There
is no ex ante cost (except for small transactions costs) for undertaking the
hedge.18
Proof: Follows from equations (1), (2), (3), (7), and (9)•19 Briefly,
unexpected inflation is associated with a revision in expectations of future
inflation rates because of the autoregressive nature of inflation. The FH im-
plies that this revision in expected inflation rates is associated with a
revision in Treasury bill prices. But futures prices are tied to spot prices
through the assumed UEH. Thus we have a cash flow in the futures position as-
sociated with unexpected inflation. There is no ex ante cost of undertaking a
hedge using Treasury bill futures since the UEH applies. (For inflation hedg-
ing with possibly nonzero ex ante costs, we need only a linear relation be-
tween the futures price and the expected future spot price rather than the
stronger UEH relation.)
Hedging with Treasury bill futures can protect both against the risks of
regime changes (discussed in subsection 2.1) and against unexpected inflation
within regimes.2° We do not investigate the benefits of such joint hedging
prospects. (Also, effective implementation of our inflation hedging strategy
18There are two types are transactions costs, both of which we ignore in
our analysis. One involves direct brokerage costs associated with entering
and exiting the futures position. The other is associated with ensuring a
minimum maintenance margin in the face of possible adverse daily markings-to-
the-market. (The opportunity cost of lost interest on the posted margin can
be avoided by using interest-bearing assets as collateral.)
19The flow from the futures position is obtained in terms of percentage
of original futures price rather than of dollar flows; the expression in terms
of dollars is an approximation.
20Since we have one hedging instrument and two imperfectly correlated
risks, the risk-minimizing strategy will be suboptimal for each risk in-
dividually.June 1987 page 15
may require taking a fraction of the standard $1 million Treasury bill futures
contracts. Presumably, if inflation risk hedging were of significant im-
portance, services would arise to break down such contracts.)21
As long as inflation is IMA(l,l), which is consistent with the U.S. ex-
perience, the above proposition applies to a k—interval hedging period without
modification. A straightforward generalization when inflation is IMA(d,q),
d￿l, can also be derived. Empirical evidence on our proposition is provided
in the next section. The examination for hedging potential can be interpreted
as an indirect joint test of the FH and UEH, which complements other direct
tests.(The third condition of autoregressivity of inflation is noncontrover-
sial.)
3. INFLATION RISK HEDGING
We assess the inflation risk hedging potential for the sample period of
1976-86, which covers 42 futures contracts. The strategies assessed involve
holding the futures contract to maturity. Analyses of strategies that closed
out a futures position before the maturity month did not lead to materially
different results.
3.1 Measures of Hedge Effectiveness
Bodie (1976), in evaluating common stocks as a hedge against inflation,
measures hedge effectiveness in terms of the reduction in variance achieved
21Where should the hedge against inflation risk be undertaken: at the in-
dividual or the corporate level? Individuals could tailor their holdings and
degree of protection to their own portfolio and degree of risk aversion. But
corporation-level provisions might benefit from economies of scale; protection
might avoid agency problems with corporate executives. Moreover, given dif-
ficulties of contracting (e.g., problems associated with bankruptcy), it is
perhaps desirable for firms with serious exposure to hedge themselves.June 1987 page16
for a portfolio of nominal bonds and stocks relative to that of an all-bond
portfolio. Such a measure does not fit our purposes, because it does not
separate the risk due to unexpected inflation from the risk due to changing
real returns embedded in the pricing of bonds. Fama and MacBeth (1974)
propose that a security represents an inflation hedge if its real return is
independent of inflation. This definition is well suited to studying the
Fisherian idea that for indiviudual assets there is a separation between in-
novations in the nominal sector (like unexpected inflation) and real rates. A
comprehensive study of the capacity of assets to hedge against inflation in
this sense is in Fama and Schwert (1977). However, an asset that is a perfect
hedge according to the Fama and MacBeth definition cannot reduce the loss from
inflation risk of other assets (though leveraged purchases of assets that are
based on assuming nominal indebtedness clearly offer an inflation hedge).
Our measure of hedge effectiveness focuses on how well asset returns cor-
relate with unexpected inflation. This specification of hedging effectiveness
is consistent with most of the futures literature, such as Ederington (1979).
In the context of our proposition, an asset (like Treasury bill futures) will
be a desirable inflation hedge if its returns are correlated with unexpected
inflation and its inclusion does not reduce the expected real return of the
individual' s portfolio.
3.2 Inflation Proxies
Since unexpected inflation is not directly measured, we consider a
variety of proxies summarized in table 4.June 1987
page17
TABLE 4
PROXIES OF UNEXPECTED INFLATION
Based on Consumer Price Index:
UDt based on Data Resources Inc. (DRI) forecast of CPIinflation
UFHtbased on FH, unbiased market expectations, andconstant ex ante real
returns but for regime shifts; see Patel (1986).
based on a random-walk model for inflation.
Based on GNP Deflator:
UASAt =basedon mean forecast reported in survey by American StatisticalAs-
sociation/National Bureau of Economic Research.
UDRItbased on DRI forecast of GNPD inflation
The unexpected inflation proxies should havezero mean and be serially uncor-
related. Table 5 reports univariate sample statistics forthe variables of
interest where 'F°' is the futures price atmaturity and C [=F_k_F]
is the cash flow from holding a futures position from kperiods before
maturity until maturity.None of the means for the unexpected-inflation proxies is statistically
significantly different from zero. The proxies of unexpected inflation are
consistent with ex ante unbiased forecasts——their overall autocorrelations are
close to zero except for UASA and possibly air, both of which we find in later
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UDRI -0.70 1.16 .05 .26- .09 .25
NOTES: (1) The asterisked estimates may not correspond to population
values since the underlying series appear mean nonstationary.
(2) The sample period for ir(GNPD), UD, ASA/NBER, and DRI is 76Q3-85Ql.
aThe standard error for the autocorrelations, assuming a null hypothesis
of white noise, is 0.18.
bSee table 4 for definition of unexpected inflation proxies.June 1987 page19
autocorrelations in the inflation series (corresponding to unexpected infla-
tion if the inflation forecast is simply the sample mean) is largely (and
properly) eliminated in our proxies.
3.3 Quality of Inflation Hedge
How effective empirically is the quality of the inflation hedgeprovided
by Treasury bill futures? Our hedging proposition (see section 2.4) predicts
that the cash flow from a Treasury bill futures contract will benegatively
correlated with the contemporaneous surprise in inflation. These cross-
correlations and covariances with alternative proxies of unexpected inflation
are given in table 6.
TABLE 6
COVARIANCES/CORRELATIONS OF UNEXPECTED INFLATION PROXIES
ANDCASHFLOWFROM FUTURES POSITION
Sample Period: 76Q3-86Q4
(except 76Q3-85Q1 for UD, UASA, UDRI)
UFH UD UASA UDRI C3
8.17 .63 .62 .43 .28 -.14
UFH 3.23.22.73 .35 .35 -.29
UD 3.69 2.70 4.65 .45 .48 -.36
UASA 1.50 0.75 1.22 1.57 .58 -.15
UDRI 1.03 0.81 1.40 0.98 1.80 -.36
C3 -0.88 -1.14 -1.86 -0.46 -l.16 4.75
NOTE: The on-diagonal entries are variances. The super-diagonal entries
(upper triangle) are correlations. The sub-diagonal entries (lower triangle)
are covariances.sir, UFH, and UD are for CPI inflation while UASA and UDRI
are for GNPD inflation——see table 4 for details of construction.June 1987 page20
As predicted, the cash flow, C, is negatively correlated with inflation
risk measured by unanticipated changes in the CPI and with unanticipated
changes in the GNPD. The magnitude of the C correlation with Eir and UASA
is small, but these were precisely the poorest proxies of unexpected inflation
in the sense discussed following table 5. The absolute sizes of the C cor-
relations are comparable to the cross-correlations of unexpected inflation
measures across the two price indices, which are about 0.4.
Thus, while a Treasury bill futures will not hedge CPI (GNPD) risk as
well as a CPI (GNPD) futures contract, it performs as well for GNPD (CPI) risk
as would a CPI (GNPD) contract. Since the true price risks of different
agents in the economy may, in general, diverge as much as the price risks of
the CPI versus the GNPD, the Treasury bill futures contract may be at least as
adequate an omnibus hedge for price risk as a CPI (or a GNPD) futures con-
tract. We have more to say on this issue in section 4.
The risk-minimizing hedge ratio is also of interest. Consider the
regression:
lrt=a
where U1r is a measure of unexpected inflation and C is the cash flow aris-
ing from a long position in a Treasury bill futures contract over period
Our proposition (see section 2.4) predicts thatequals —l/(l+O). Of course,
as discussed, if only the Weak FH holds, /3 need not equal —1/(l-i-) though it
will remain strictly negative (i.e., inflation risk hedging potential will
remain). The Wt in equation (10) should be unpredictable given information at
t—l. How should we interpret wO in the context of our proposition? Con-
sider two possibilities besides the possibility that the Strong FH fails.
22Equation (11) projects the risk to be hedged onto the hedging instru-
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First, our measures of unexpected inflation may be only a proxy for the
representative agent's price inflation, which is embedded in market prices,
either because t(measured)t('ttrue") or because our inflationexpectations
measures are not exact. In this view, w is interpreted as a measurement er-
ror. Of course, with measurement errors, our estimates of the hedge ratio, /3,
may no longer be consistent. The problem of biased OLS estimation of /3 is
eliminated only if the measurement error is uncorrelated with C.
Second, additional information may become available after t—l, beyond the
unexpected inflation from t—l to t, that affects the market's revision in in-
flationary expectations. Alternatively, our estimated IMA(l,l) modelmay not
be the same as the model used by the market to form inflationaryexpectations.
In any case, let us turn to the estimates of the hedging potential with the
data at hand.
Before we turn to estimation of /3,apossible complication may be induced
by a shift in inflationary regime that took place around 1982. As widely dis-
cussed in the monetary economics literature, experts diagnosed a shift in
monetary policy implementation during 1979-82- -for instance, see Roley (1986)
or Bradley and Jansen (1986). In this case, the coefficients of the inflation
forecast revision process discussed in section 2.3 may be different in the
pre- and the post-1982 periods. Some evidence on this issue is reported in





Proxy for Ulrt /3 Risk /3 Risk
Reductiona Reductjona
(a) UFH(FH,CPI) —0.21 33% 125b 38%b
(0.12) (0.78)
(b) UD (DRI,CPI) -0.32 40% -1.10 29%
(0.14) (1.08)
(c) UDRI (DRI,GNPD) -0.20 39% -0.68 32%
(0.09) (0.69)
NOTE: The estimates of the intercept were always close to zero in simple
regressions that included a constant. This finding of a zero intercept is
foreshadowed in table 5 where the means of the variables in the regression
were seen to be close to zero.
aThe risk-reduction measure is simply the correlation.
bThe sample period for this case is 83Q1-86Q4.
The few observations in the post-1982 period preclude a powerful test for a
shift in the risk-minimizing hedge coefficients. Nonetheless, the qualitative
evidence in table 7 seems to indicate such a shift, which is consistent with
our arguments.
Our weak prediction was that we would observe hedging potential and that
/3 would be negative. This is confirmed. Consider the sharper prediction that
as implied by the Strong FH and our auxiliary assumptions. The
univariate inflation model estimated in table 3 gives a 01—estimate of —0.52,
which corresponds to an implied /3 of around -2. This sharp prediction for /3
isrejected even after we make an allowance for the uncertainty of the
estimate. The /3-estimates in table 7 argue against the strong FR assumingJune 1987 page 23
that the inflation proxies used are unbiased estimates of the true inflation
risk of concern to financial market participants.
4. INFLATION RISK HEDGING: NEED AND COMPLICATIONS
Having established that Treasury bill futures can hedge against inflation
risk, we now ask whether there is a need for such hedging. We also discuss
the multiperiod hedging problem, which introduces complications not present in
the single-period situation examined in the empirical sections.
4.1 Who Needs an Inflation Risk Hedge?
Society as a whole may benefit or lose from inflation. But to the extent
that the future rate of inflation is known, one cannot hedge against these
costs in a rational market.23 Similarly if expectations are held in common24
——the assumption here and in the finance literature generally——it will not be
possible to hedge against this inflation component.
23A natural psychological propensity, which should be avoided, is tocom-
pare the risks of unexpected inflation against the background of the costs of
anticipated inflation. The marginal risk imposed by unexpected inflation,
given inflation risks and all other risks, is the quantity of interest. An
alternate version of this risk is seen in discussions of risks to life. In
that arena 10,000 additional cases of a cancer that otherwise causes 500
deaths per year seem more important than 15,000 incremental cases of a cancer
claiming 100,000 individuals annually. See the discussion of framing in Kah-
neman et al. (1982).
24The formation of homogeneous inflationary expectations is aided by a
market where assets trade that depend on inflationary expectations: Hayek
(1945) is a classic exposition; Grossman and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) develop
models that address information aggregation in competitive markets. To the
extent that reduced divergence among agents' expectations about the rational
expectation mitigates welfare losses from inflation risk, overall welfare will
be improved by the identification of assets where individuals can trade on
differential information about inflationary expectations.June 1987 page 24
Whatever the costs of anticipated inflation,25 unexpected inflation im-
poses clear significant risks and real costs.26 There is substantial
redistribution of risk between debtors and creditors when loan contracts are
specified in nominal terms; workers' wages are only partially indexed with
price level, while benefits such as pension payments are not indexed at all.27
All assets denominated in nominal terms are at risk. By 1981, more than
$1,680 billion of listed bonds in the United States fell into this category.
(Indeed the market value of nominal bonds exceeds that of equities.) Whether
citizens gain or lose on net is not the critical question for our work (though
the answer to it would tell us what sign to expect for an inflation risk
premium).28 As long as some individuals are at risk from unexpected inflation
(i.e., not perfectly balanced), a hedging instrument will be of use. Quite
likely there would be hedgers on both sides of the market.
25Fully anticipated inflation may impose significant costs: utilities
with regulated returns based on historical costs, workers stuck in a profes-
sion, or retirees with pensions fixed in nominal terms may be badly hurt when
expected inflation is high; debtors, owners of real assets, tenants under rent
control, and those who switch nimbly among sectors of the economy may benefit.
There may be general benefits as well. The Keynesian macroeconomic paradigm
suggests a strong argument in favor of nonzero inflation: adjustment to equi-
librium entailing relative price adjustments is facilitated by overall infla-
tion if there is downward price inflexibility (which is quite plausible for
wages).
26Another type of inflation risk arises if general price levelun-
certainty is associated with relative price uncertainty. Lucas (1972) is the
classic work. Patel and Zeckhauser (1985) argue that a common cost-of-living
index is inadequate for heterogeneous agents given the empirical properties of
prices. Their finding underscores the difficulty of providing adequate infla-
tion hedges based on general contractual agreements.
27Card (1986) estimates that only about 10% of the U.S. labor force has
substantial cost-of-living wage indexation.
28See Fischer (1986; section I) and cited references therein for further
discussion of costs of both expected and unexpected inflation.June 1987 page 25
4.2 Costs of Inflation Risk
The standard deviation of unexpected inflation is 3.1% (basedon UD or
UFH for the 1972-83 period--see table 4). Though thisappears small in rela-
tion to the standard deviation of the returns on a broadequity index port-
folio, it may be worth hedging against. (For 1926-81, Ibbotson and Sin-
quefield (1983, p. 36) find that annual stock returns had a standard deviation
of 21.7%.)
How costly is such inflation risk to an individual? Consideran in-
dividual with the constant risk aversion utility function U herew
is terminal wealth in thousands of real dollars.(For a =0.02,a parameter
value we consider, such an individual would accept a certain $4,750 inex-
change for a 50—50 gamble on $10,000 or $0.) If this individual is to receive
a nominal terminal wealth of $1 million, expected utility calculations show
that he would be willing to pay $8,897 to eliminateunexpected inflation un-
certainty whose distribution is taken to be the same as that empirically ob-
served for the 1972-83 period.29 Additional uncertaintiesmay raise or lower
the value of an inflation hedge depending on the utility functionand the cor-
relation between the risks.
In contrast to the utility-based example, a preference-free calculation
can be based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Suppose thatwe have
only two classes of risky assets: stocks and single-period nominal bonds. As-
sulue, using the historical values in Ibbotson and Sinquefield (1983), that the
expected real return on stocks is 8% and the standard deviation is 20%. The
standard deviation of annual unexpected inflation has been about 5% for the
29For a0.01, which implies that the 50—50 gamble of $0 or $10,000 is
worth $4,875, he would pay $4,583 for a perfect hedge against inflation.June 1987 page 26
past decade. For different values of the correlation between the prices of
stocks and nominal bonds and the relative weights in the market portfolio, the
CAPM provides us with the expected premium for bearing inflation risk.30 To
illustrate, let us £ ix the nominal debt-to-equity ratio at unity and the real
riskiess borrowing and lending rate at zero. If inflation has a correlation
of 0.3 with equity returns, the removal of one unit of inflation risk is worth
1.02% in real return at the margin. If the correlation were 0.0, it would be
worth 0.5%. These amounts are in line with the previous calculationsusing
the utility function.
4.3 On Using CPI Contracts
Why,ifinflation risk is important, should one not simply use the CPI
futures contracts recently introduced on the Coffee, Cocoa, and Sugar Ex-
change, as the hedge? Barro (1986), for example, makes a case for CPI futures
contracts and predicts success for them. Unfortunately, the CPI futures con-
tract has failed to generate adequate trading interest to assure depth and ef-
ficiency. For instance, on June 30, 1986, after more than a year of trading,
only 105 contracts were open; even worse, no contracts traded on this day. A
number of explanations are possible.
First, there may have been a minimum-scale problem: the contract did not
achieve sufficient volume and liquidity to become self-sustaining, perhaps
because its exchange is not prominent. In addition, there aremany measures
30With two risky assets and the riskless rate set tozero, the CAPM can
be solved to obtain:
Er2 =Er1{(l-8)u22+67l2]/{(l8)Oi2+1l]
Here subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the two different assets, Er denotes the
expected returns, a denotes the variances/covariances, and 6 denotes the pro-
portion of the first asset to the sum of the two assets.June 1987
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of inflation. Perhaps the CPI does not sufficiently approximate thecost-of-
living index of most prospective hedgers. Conceivably the analysis of Barro
and the one contained here are in error, or theremay be no need for an infla-
tion risk hedge. Or quite possibly the contract was formulated ina manner
that was unappealing or inaccessible to the public. TheCoffee, Cocoa, and
Sugar Exchange is now reformulating its contract to be defined in terms of in-
flation rates, rather than in the levels of the CPI index,a change that may
facilitate understanding.31 Aron and Lazear (1985) reacha negative conclu-
sion on the potential for an inflation-hedge contract. Theirconceptual, not
empirical, inquiry helped discourage the Chicago Mercantile Exchange from
launching such a contract (personal commmunication, Lazear, 1986). Given the
inadequacy of the current CPI instrument, the use of Treasury bill futuresto
hedge risk remains a viable option.
4.4 Multiperiod Hedging
If the world were kind to us analytically, (1) all contracts wouldbe
written at the beginning of one period and paid off at theend, and (2) ex-
pected inflation in the next period would be independent of observed inflation
31Since most agents are familiar with theCPI inflation rate, the readily
understandable contract would be in terms of inflation and not in terms ofthe
level. How many economists even know the latest CPI level? On the other
hand, the inflation rate is widely discussed.
Second, money illusion may be more pervasive and significant than conven-
tional wisdom suggests. Maybe Fisher (1928) was right after all.Indeed,
Modigliani and Cohn (1979) conclude that money illusion was a major
determinant of the behavior of U.S. equities in the 1970s.
Third, and most simply, individuals may face only minimal net inflation
risk. Minimal inflation risk in the aggregate is not sufficient toexplain
the failure of the CPI contracts; in fact, if inflation risk cancels out in
the aggregate but individuals face risk, we would expect CPI futurescontracts
to be very successful because of the need for and feasibility of inexpensive
risk spreading.June 1987 page 28
in this period. The world is cruel. Contracts are written for varying
lengths of time, and many expectations and practices in effect extend con-
tracts much longer than their formal duration. Professors' salaries and rent-
al apartments in private houses, for example, though renegotiated every year
tend to lag behind inflation increases, perhaps because of money illusion or
considerations of fairness.32 Regulatory proceedings, say on utility rates,
are subject to political pressures, where exorbitance is measured in nominal
terms. The prices of very long-term contracts, such as might be found with
employment when there is substantial job-specific human capital, are sometimes
contingent on increases in the price level. More likely, however, prices
beyond the initial period will reflect expected inflation over the duration of
the contract; the complexities of multiperiod inflation risks introduce them-
selves
320n fairness in pricing, see Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986).
33Mortgages tend to be written for a long period of time, thus encounter-
ing inflation risk. Variable-rate mortgages protect against such risk, assum-
ing that inflation is a principal determinant of nominal interest rates. In-
terestingly, such mortgages have only recently come into widespread use.
Moreover, the upward and downward swings in interest rates tend to be capped,
presumably to protect against risk, although this actually increases the risk
of the real cost of the mortgage. However, if mortgagors are beneficiaries of
other nominal contracts, some dampening of swings in nominal rates may be
beneficial.
341f the inflation rate in period t does not affect ex ante real returns
or expected inflation in t+l, then an investor in nominal bonds is indifferent
between buying a two-period bond and rolling over one-period bonds. By con-
trast, a worker with constant marginal product would reduce his risk if his
wage was set at the beginning of each period. He will now get wages in the
second period that account for the change in purchasing power from the first.
However, if inflation surprises in period t are reflected in expected in-
flation in period t+l, an additional class of risk is imposed on two-period
(multiperiod) contracts, namely the uncertainty about expected inflation for
period t+l as assessed at the beginning of period t. Even the nominal bond
investor will be protected by rolling over contracts on a period-by-period
basis.June 1987 page 29
The dynamic problem of inflation risk in multiperiod settings isquite
complicated. For instance, the inflation risk for a worker faced with nominal
wage contracts can be quite different from the inflation risk for a investor
in nominal financial instruments. Consider a two-period horizon with infla-
tion rates that are independent between periods. Assume that the real
marginal product of labor is the same in each period and that wages are set in
nominal terms. A worker with wages set at the beginning of each period is
better off than a worker with wages set for both periods. The former hasan
opportunity to get wages for the second period that account for the change in
purchasing power experienced in the first period. In contrast, a investor in
nominal bonds is indifferent between buying a two-period bond androlling over
one-period bonds if ex ante real returns are a constant. The result is readi-
ly understood by recognizing that the bond transaction is a purchase and
resale while the employment transaction is a rentalagreement.
Further, innovations in inflation during this period substantially affect
expectations for following periods: our estimates, based on the model in table
1, indicate that a 1% unexpected inflation in a year leads to an upward revi-
sion of 0.43% for expected inflation for the forthcomingyear and 1% for the
years beyond that. An individual with nominal contracts that extend beyond
the year is at risk not only for this period's unexpected inflation, but for
its contribution to (predicted impact upon) expected inflation insubsequent
years. The weighting process to compute average duration of contracts is sub-
tle, with weights adjusted not only for dollar amounts, but to allow for com-
pounding within the year, and to permit declining effects over time of this
year's unexpected inflation on post-year expected inflation. The impact of
unexpected inflation on future expected inflation will still be important forJune 1987 page 30
applying our results to specific cases——the calculations will be tedious but
straightforward.
5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Futures contracts on Treasury bills can reduce inflation risk by about
30-40%. The expected cost of using such futures is close to zero.35 Treasury
bill futures may remain the main means of hedging inflation risk since CPI fu-
tures contracts have not become well established.
Our analysis also bears on the portfolio strategy for obtaining outcomes
that minimize real-return risk. Current practice capitalizes on the FH by un-
dertaking a strategy of rolling over Treasury bills. Our finding that UFH
risk correlates 33-38% with cashflows from Treasury bill futures (in tables 6
and 7) indicates that an improved strategy is available. Such a strategy
would roll over both Treasury bills and Treasury bill futures. Further, we
conjecture that investors exposed to purchasing power risk of the Canadian
dollar or the British pound can exploit our results as well, since (a) their
inflation experience and their support for the FH is similar to that of the
United States (see Patel (1986)) and (b) they have instruments analogous to
U.S. Treasury bill futures.
The standard deviation of annual unexpected inflation over the 1953-84
period was approximately 2.1%. In these circumstances, we find that inflation
risk (i.e., the variability in ex post purchasing power of nominal claims due
35Monte Carlo simulations employed to assess this cost reaffirm the need
for special care in econometric procedures when the variables have near-unit
autoregressive roots. For the small sample sizes that we deal with (<50 ob-
servations), standard tests would have rejected the UEH, whereas the simula-
tions suggest that the OLS estimates could reasonably have arisen with the UEH
being true.June 1987 page 31
to unexpected inflation) can impose significant costs on individuals. Unex-
pected inflation has effects that carry beyond the period in which itoccurs,
influencing expectations of subsequent inflation and possibly affecting ex
ante real rates of return as well. Either effect would magnify the costsas-
sociated with unexpected inflation.
An intriguing future investigation would be to examine the inflation risk
of a representative diversified portfolio. But whatever such astudy might
show, the value of a hedging instrument for inflation risk is not to beun-
derestimated: few individuals hold a fully diversified portfolio ofassets.
The explanation is more than ignorance. Substantial portions of individuals'
holdings are in human capital, small businesses, or other hard-to-diversify
assets. This implies that many individuals are likely to be exposed tosig-
nificant inflation risk and can be helped by a strategy that reduces thisrisk
at low cost. We recognize that many individuals are unconcerned byor indeed
even unaware of inflation risk, perhaps because of the same factors that
produce the more surprising ignorance associated with money illusion.Hedging
against an underrecognized risk may be an acquired taste, or possibly even a
merit good.
Our results support the weak Fisher Hypothesis for Treasury billpricing
and the Unbiased Expectations Hypothesis for the pricing of Treasury bill fu-
tures.June 1987 page 32
APPENDIX
MONTE CARLO SIMUlATIONS TO ASSESS ThE UEII
Ourfirst step for setting up simulations was to identify a time-series
model for the Treasury bill prices, Bt (F).Bt is found to be (near)
nonstationary.36 Formal statistical tests are in table Al.
The slow decay of the autocorrelations is consistent with a near nonsta-
tionary process. The results of the Fuller (1976) test based on the t-
statisticof do not reject the hypothesis that is nonstationary. Thus,
we model B, the 90-day Treasury bill price, as a nonstationary process.
Assuming the Bt has a unit autoregressive root, we consider a stationary
model for Bt in the differences. An adequate stationary autoregressive model
(see Box and Jenkins (1976)) is found to be:
6
(Al) EBt =a+ + i1
The choice of six lags is simply based on selecting the minimum number of
lags that provides white noise residuals. The summary statistics from fitting
the above model appear in table A2.
36Bt may have only a near-unit autoregressive root if we believe that the
possible range of interest rates is bounded. In this scenario, our simula-
tions are still useful if Bt behaves "locallyt' like a unit root process.June 1987 page 33
TABLE A2
SUMMARY STATISTICS
a$2 /33 /34 /356
Parameter estimates -0.010.39-0.360.67-0.240.21-0.36
t-statistjc -0.463.58-3.090.58-2.021.84-3.33
Adjusted R2 =0.22 Degreesof freedom =73 0.0529
NOTE: Residual autocorrelations (not reported) are consistent with a
white noise process——that is, not significantly different from zero.
We use the estimates shown in table A2 to set up our Monte Carlo simulations.
For each simulation, we draw 200 n's (representing innovations inBt) from a
normal distribution with zero mean and variance 0.0529
Weuse the /3-estimates of table A2 to create a simulated Bt-series, .
Wealso construct one-step- through six-step-ahead optimal forecasts for the
series given the true generating process. These forecast series, Ek,
represent futures prices assuming that futures prices are efficient unbiased
forecasts of the Lseries.We drop the first 90 simulation values to
mitigate start-up effects.
Next, we sample every third observation of and the associated one-
step-ahead through six-step-ahead forecasts, Et-i through E6-6. This
corresponds to the situation where we have only futures contracts with a
quarterly maturity cycle. We then perform six OLS-regressions, each with 31
observations (corresponding to the sample size in table 1). The regressions
are of on a constant and the E-series. We save the coefficient estimates
(corresponding to a and /3intable 1 in the main text) of each of the six
regressions in 1000 simulations. The results appear in figure 1 in the main
text.June 1987 page 34
We assess the power of tests based on the results in table 1 and figure 1
by considering simulations where the trueis 0.1 (rather than 1.0 as
predicted by the UEH). We repeat the simulation method discussed above to
generate L.However,in this set of simulations the E?1throughE3
areO.lxt-fut where Ut is normal i.i.d. with standard deviation corresponding
to the values in table 1. Following the earlier simulations, we save the
coefficients of each of three regression in 1000 simulations. The results are
in figure 2 in the main text.June 1987 page 35
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